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FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
THE BOOTH CASES
A.

J.

BEITZINGER*

Early in the evening of April 28, 1859, William T. Carroll, Clerk
of the U.S. Supreme Court, went to the White House and delivered
a copy of Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Ableman v. Booth to President Buchanan. In accepting the document, the worried Buchanan
told Carroll that "the Supreme Court and the Executive should stand
shoulder to shoulder in such a crisis, that united they might be able
to resist the fanaticism of both the North and the South." To that end,
he added, he was determined to execute the decrees of the court with
all the force and power that the Constitution and laws placed at his
disposal.1
Buchanan's statement epitomized a policy of cooperation between
federal law enforcement officers and judges, which had been prefigured in the administrations of his two immediate predecessors and
experienced its most effective defeat in the events leading up to and following directly upon the very opinion he held in his hand.2 The story
of Wisconsin's successful nullification of the fugitive slave law and its
defiance of federal judicial authority has been peviously told in terms

of the respective histories of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court and the Department of Justice, the work of Chief Justice Taney, the development of American Constitutional Law and the
local opposition to the law. 3 In this paper, the writer will attempt to
treat the episode purely as a law enforcement problem by describing
and interpreting the events from the angle of those men most intimately challenged, the federal officers and judges at both the local and
national levels.
Federal authority in Wisconsin in the 1850's was represented principally by a district attorney, a marshal and his deputies, a federal district judge and a court commissioner. There were no federal troops
which could be called upon for aid. Likewise there was no federal
jail; federal prisoners were quartered in the state and county jail un*Professor, The Catholic University of America
1 Memorandum of William T. Carroll, appended to original transcript of record of Ableman v. Booth and U.S. v. Booth, 21 Howard, 506 (1859), Office
of Clerk of U.S. Supreme Court.
2 The Dred Scott decision in 1857 unquestionably brought greater public disfavor with the Supreme Court in the North. However, because a great conflict
of jurisdiction and the alleged preservation of state's rights were involved in
the Booth cases, the attempt to enforce federal law and court decisions in
Wisconsin gave rise to a more effective opposition. Thus not merely the
Supreme Court and the Democratic Party were threatened but federal authority itself.
3

See

CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (Bos-
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der the custody of state officials. Effective enforcement of the law
was predicated upon cooperation by the state authorities and a whole4

some popular support.

The administrative link between the law enforcement officials at
Washington and the district attorneys throughout the country was
then but narrowly defined. Along with the marshals, the attorneys were
subject to the instructions of the Solicitor of the Treasury, who directed and superintended the conduct of civil suits involving the United
States. The Attorney General had authority merely "to advise with
and direct" the Solicitor of the Treasury at the latter's request. As a
consequence, in criminal cases, the district attorneys were left with
a wide degree of discretion in the fulmillment of their sworn duties.
For guidance on policy and legal advice, they generally relied upon
previous court decisions and the opinions of the Attorney General.5
Due to the dilatoriness of Congress, Wisconsin remained, until
1862, outside of any federal judicial circuit and the district judge was
left unchecked. In civil suits below the statutory sum, there was no
appeal from his rulings. Because no federal statute then provided for
an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in criminal cases, a conviction in
his court was final-a fact which, in good part, explains the propensity
of the state judges to interfere by habeas corpus.6
Opposition to federal authority in Wisconsin first flared into open
defiance in 1854 over the attempt to enforce the unpopular Fugitive
Slave Law of 1850. That act amended the original law of 1793 by
vesting, in federal judges and court commissioners, exclusive jurisdiction to determine summarily and without appeal whether a person was
a fugitive from labor and service in another state. Attempts to rescue
ton 1923) Vol. II, 532-539, Vol. III, 58-70, JOHN B. WINSLOW, THE STORY OF A
GREAT COURT (Chicago, 1913). HOMER CUMMINS AND CARL
IcFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE (New York, 1937), 179-182, CARL B. SWISHER, A.MtERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (Boston, 1943), 251-254, CARL SWISHER, ROGER B.
TANEY, (N.Y. 1936) 526-533. Vroman Mason, "The Fugitive Slave Law in

Wisconsin, With Reference to Nullification Sentiment," Proceedings of
the State Historical Society of Wisconsin (1895), 117-144, George Carter,
"The Booth War in Wisconsin," Proceedings of the State Historical Society
of Wisconsin (1902), 161-172.
4 For acts of Congress calling upon state legislatures to provide for the keeping of federal prisoners in state jails and authorizing temporary jails in the
event a state either did not comply or withdrew previous authorization, see,
1 Stat. 96 (Act of Sept. 23, 1789), 3 Stat. 646 (Act of Mar .3, 1821), 4 Stat.
632 (Act of Mar. 2, 1833). The Wisconsin Legislature, at its first session,
authorized federal use of state jails. Concerning the lack of a sizable federal
military force in Wisconsin, see F. K. Bartlett to Caleb Cushing, Jan. 28,
1855, Cushing M,ISS, Library of Congress.
CUMMINGS AND

'CFARLAND,

op.

cit. supra at 143-148.

6 President Pierce, in messages to Congress in 1853 and 1854, urged a reorganization of the federal judicial system so as to include states like Wisconsin
in a ci-'uit. RICHARDSON, MTESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE I'RESIDENTS, Xol. VI,
2750, 2751, 2825. Attorney General Caleb Cushing called the lack of circuit
courts in certain areas of the country a "plain violation of the true spirit of

the Constitution." Cushing to Pierce, Feb. 4, 1854, 6 A. G. Op. 276, 277.
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an alleged fugitive from federal custody were punishable by fine and
imprisonment. If a fugitive was rescued or escaped from federal custody, the marshal became subject to the possibility of a civil suit for
damages by the claimant owner.'
Legal guideposts in the administration of the law and the outlines
of a general enforcement policy were pricked out in the early years
of the decade. By 1854, Justices Curtis, Grier, Nelson and Woodbury
of the U.S. Supreme Court had sustained the constitutionality of the
law in charges to juries while on circuity However, questions regarding protection from retaliatory civil and criminal actions in state tribunals for the mere enforcement of the law and the course to be followed
upon state interference by habeas corpus were of more pressing concern to the federal officials. A law passed in 1833 to combat nullification in South Carolina afforded ample protection to federal authorities
confronted with obstruction in the enforcement of the revenue laws.
The act directly concerned general law enforcement by empowering
federal courts to issue habeas corpus when an individual was confined
for acts done or omitted in pursuance of federal lawY In 1852, Congress supplemented this protection by guaranteeing federal payment of
the extraordinary expenses incurred in the execution of the law by ministerial officers 0° Similarly, by 1854, the Attorney General had announced that when federal marshals weie obstructed in the execution
of federal law and the question of the constitutionality of the law was
put forth in subsequent suits against them, the defense of such suits
would be undertaken by the United States. 1 By that time the Attorney
General had also advised that it was the right of a marshal, in cases
involving fugitives, to answer state writs of habeas corpus by reciting
the authority under which the person was held and refusing to produce
2

the body.1

Both the Fillmore and Pierce Administrations had demonstrated
a determination to enforce the controversial law vigorously. The former
went to the extreme of resolving upon indictments for treason of the
79 Stat. 462-464 (Act of Sept. 8, 1850). See Mason, op. cit., for the story of
widespread opposition to the law in Wisconsin. For a consideration of the

legal arguments against the law, see Allen Tohnson, The Constitutionality of
the Fugitive Slave Acts, 31 YALE L. J. (1921), 161-182.
s For Curtis' charge, see U.S. v. Morris, 1 Curtis C. C. 23 (1851) ; for Grier's
charge see U.S. v. Hanway, Fed. Cases No. 15299 C. C., E. D., Pa. (1851);
for Nelson's grand jury charge, see Fed. Cases No. 18261 C.C., S.D. N.Y.
(1851) ; for an account of Woodbury's charge, see SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY,
482.
94 Stat. 632-635 (Act of Mar. 2, 1833).
10 10 Stat. 99 (Act of Aug. 31, 1852).
11 Cushing to Pierce, Nov. 14, 1853, 6 A.G. Op., 220-223.
12 Cushing to R. McClelland, Dec. 20, 1853, 6 A.G. Op., 237-239. Although this
opinion involved a fugitive from justice, it implicitly covered fugitives from
labor and service as well.
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13

rescuers of a fugitive slave in Pennsylvania. In May, 1854, Pierce's
Attorney General, Caleb Cushing, announced that when a marshal was
opposed in the execution of the law, he had the authority to summon
to his aid the entire able-bodied force of the area, including the available federal and state armed forces, and that the Federal Government
would defray costs." At the same time, Pierce emphatically informed
a marshal in Boston who had boldly availed himself of federal troops
to prevent a rescue, "Your conduct is approved. The law must be
executed."'"
Almost two months before the Pierce Administration's pronouncements, the Wisconsin episode began. On March 10, 1854, C. C. Cotton, a deputy marshal, armed with a warrant issued by Federal District
Judge Andrew G. Miller and aided by Bennammi Garland, a citizen
of Missouri, captured the latter's alleged fugitive slave, Joshua Glover,
near Racine, Wisconsin. Taken to Milwaukee the next day, Glover was
placed in the county jail pending a hearing. 6
Apprised of these facts, Sherman M. Booth, editor of the Milwaukee abolitionist newspaper, the Free Democrat, mounted his horse and
galloped through the streets, stopping at each corner to shout, "Freemen! To the rescue! Slave-catchers are our midst! Be at the courthouse at two o'clock!" Meanwhile, Booth's lawyers persuaded the
judge of the County Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to the
deputy marshal ordering him to bring Glover before him immediately
and justify his retention."
When the afternoon mass-meeting began, the federal authorities
soon became aware of the "law-defying mob" before the court-house.
Realizing that no officer could command sufficient force to prevent
a rescue of Glover the moment he was taken from tht jail, Judge
Miller promptly postponed the hearing for two days in order to allow
the people time to reflect and the federal officers time to collect force.
He also informed an emmissary of Booth that no power on earth
could take Glover from his jurisdiction, thus precluding any voluntary
compliance with the state writ of habeas corpus.' 8
op. cit. supra, Vol. II, 503-505. See also, Fillmore's proclamation of
Feb. 18, 1851, calling upon "all well-disposed citizens" and commanding all
civil and military persons in the area to aid a federal marshal in Boston to
recapture a rescued fugitive from labor and to put down the combination
which had affected the "flagitious offense." RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF PRESIDENTS (New York, 1897), Vol. VI, 2645, 2646. Fillmore's
subsequent report to the Senate on his action can be found in thc. same volume
at 2637-2642.
14 Cushing to McClelland, May 27, 1854, 6 A, G. Op. 466-474.
15 Washington Union, May 28, June 3, 1854.
36 The U.S. Marshal, Stephen V. R. Ableman, was out of town at the time and
the duty devolved upon the deputy marshal.
'MMASON op. cit. supra, 124.
IsJ. R. Sharpstein to F. B. Streeter, Mar. 20, 1854, Solicitor of Treasury MSS,
National Archives. (Cited hereafter as S. T. MSS) Underscoring the extent
13
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While Miller was vigorously asserting his authority, U. S. District
Attorney John R. Sharpstein made a futile atempt to secure aid, going
to the point of promising the commander of a federally-armed military
battalion that his men would be paid if they obeyed the marshal's
requisition. The commander apparently acquiesced but the men in the
ranks peremptorily declined to do duty.' 9
At the court-house meeting, a vigilance committee, headed by
Booth, was appointed to prevent the "kidnapping" of Glover by the
federal authorities. Shortly after Booth finished a fiery speech, in
which while advising against violence he declared that if his listeners
were of his mind he knew what they would do, the mob, led by one of
the committeemen, John Ryecraft, battered down the jail doors, freed
20
Glover and dispatched him to Canada.
Intoxicated with success, the Booth contingent then had Garland,
the owner of Glover, arrested for an alleged assault committed upon the
negro at the time of the capture. Reacting swiftly, judge Miller, in
pursuance of a broad interpretation of the statute of 1833, promptly
freed Garland on habeas corpus-an act which was protested as a
violation of states' rights.

2

1

District Attorney Sharpstein now moved to bring the rescuers to
justice by lodging complaints against ten of the leaders but focusing
upon Booth. At his hearing before the U.S. Court Commissioners,
Booth cried out that "rather than have the great constitutional rights
and safeguards of the people-the writ of habeas corpus and the right
of trial by jury-striken down by the fugitive slave law, I would prefer
to see every Federal officer in Wisconsin hanged to a gallows fifty
cubits higher than Haman's.

22

Unmoved, the commissioner held Booth

to bail for his appearance before the district court in its coming July
session. Booth advanced bail but, two months later, caused his surety
to deliver him to the marshal and request that he be recommitted.
Thereupon, the commissioner committed him to the custody of the
marshal whence he was placed in the county jail on a23 charge of unlawfully aiding, abetting and assisting Glover's escape.
That Booth's voluntary surrender was calculated to bring a test
of the opposition, Sharpstein pointed out that included in the crowd were the
acting mayor of Milwaukee, the city marshal, one of the publishers of the
Milwaukee Sentinel and two editors of local German newspapers. See also
Winslow, op. cit. 71.
'9 Sharpstein to Streeter, Mar. 20, 1854, S. T. MSS.
20 Mason, op. cit. supra, 125, 125, and the accounts of witnesses at Booth's trial
Milwaukee News, Jan. 12, 1855. At the trial, Booth's counsel declared that
the rescue was touched off by the news that Miller would not honor the state
writ of habeas corpus. Milwaukee Daily Free Democrat, Jan. 12, 1855.
21 Sharpstein to Streeter, Mar. 20, 1854, S.T. MSS; Speech of Timothy Howe,
reprinted in Madison State Journal, Mar. 2, 1860.
22 Mason, op cit., supra 129.
23 Transcript of record, Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506 (1859).
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case involving the constitutionality of the law in the state courts soon
became evident. On the day after his arrest, he successfully applied
for a writ of habeas corpus to Justice Abram D. Smith of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, a man known to have strong feelings against the
law.

24

When the writ was served upon Marshal Stephen Ableman, the
federal authorities were confronted with the question whether to obey
or disregard it. Sharpstein, thought that obedience "might be tortured
by some into a conception of the right to issue it," while disregarding
it "would involve the Marshal in a direct and serious conflict which
might result in a bloody strife." Reluctantly he advised Ableman to
make a return by producing both the warrant of commitment and
25

Booth.

To Sharpstein's great surprise, Smith, at the hearing, expressed
a desire to hear the constitutionality of the law discussed. Booth's
counsel, Byron Paine, then occupied a day and a half in a well-prepared
argument which had as its premise the Jeffersonian notion that the
states possess the right to interpose their authority whenever their soverign rights are violated by the Federal Government. On this basis,
he argued that Congress had no authority to legislate under the fugitive
slave clause of the Constitution and even if it did, the act of 1850 was
unconstitutional because it denied trial by jury and vested judicial
powers in commissioners. Somewhat flustered, Sharpstein followed by
26
giving a hurriedly drawn argument in defense of the statute.
On June 7, 1854, Smith ordered the release of Booth and read a
lengthy opinion. Instead of stopping after finding the warrant of
commitment defective, he felt impelled as a "sentinel" guarding the
rights of the states and the principles of the constitution to adopt
Paine's points and declare the law unconstitutional.27
After Solicitor of the Treasury F. B. Streeter and Attorney General Caleb Cushing had been informed of Booth's release, Sharpstein,
acting for Ableman, successfully petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme
Court to review Smith's decision on certiorari. With the approval of
President Pierce, he then retained the state's most eminent lawyer,
Edward G. Ryan, to assist him in the argument before the state court
28
and to prosecute the rescuers in the federal court.
The case of Ableman v. Booth was heard before the Wisconsin
24Joseph Schaefer, "The Booth Case," 20 Wisconsin Magazine of History,
(Sept., 1936), 91.
25 Sharpstein to Streeter, June 2, 1854, S. T. MSS.
26The arguments of both Paine and Sharpstein can be found in \VISCONSRN
MISCELLANEOUS
PAMPHLETS, Vol. XXVII, Wisconsin Historical
Society
Library.
27 For Smith's opinion, see In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854).
28 Sharpstein to Streeter, June 2, 3, 1854, Streeter to Sharpstein. June 14, 1854,
S. T. MSS; Cushing to Streeter, Sept. 11, 1854, 6 A. G. Op. 713. 711.
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High Court late in June, 1854. Paine gave substantially the same argument which he had made before Smith. The federal attorneys maintained that the acts of federal court commissioners were acts of the
court and that the jurisdiction of the court could not be ousted, citing
grounds of comity, the primacy of the federal judiciary in cases involving the federal constitution and laws, and the lack of power in both
federal and state courts to discharge each other's prisoners upon habeas corpus. After arguing that the writ of commitment at most contanied "mere formal inaccuracies," for which Booth was not entitled
to habeas corpus, they vigorously defended the constitutionality of the
29
fugitive slave laws of 1793 and 1850.

Finding the writ of commitment defective because it did not precisely state that Booth had aided a fugitive from labor to escape from
custody, the Court, on July 19, 1854, unanimously affirmed Smith's
decision. In separate opinions, Chief Justice Whiton and Smith declared the law of 1850 unconstitutional while Justice Crawford defended its validity.30
I Rebuffed, Sharpstein now urged Cushing to appeal the decision
to
the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of error in the belief that "a plain
and direct decision ...

would be respected, obeyed and enforced even

here." He also informed Cushing that thereafter the marshal would
not obey state writs of habeas corpus unless so ordered by Washington. 31
Meanwhile the federal district court had opened its July session.
In a vigorous charge to the grand jury called to indict the rescuers,
Miller warned that "if the people do not sustain the marshals ... in the
lawful discharge of their official functions, or if courts and juries
refuse them legal redress for resistance to process, they will be forced
to resort to forcible means.

3 2

After the jury indicted Booth and John Ryecraft for aiding, assisting and abetting the escape of Glover, the rearrested Booth applied
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court for another writ of habeas corpus.
This time, however, the writ was unanimously denied on the ground
that jurisdiction had now attached to the federal court and could not33
be interfered with by state process before a judgment was rendered.
The federal authorities could now claim a momentary victory. The
organ of the Pierce Administration in Washington printed a letter
29 For reprint of U. S. Government brief, see Madison Argus and Democrat,

June 30, 1854.
In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854).
31 Sharpstein to Cushing, July 22, 1854, Attorney General's MSS, National Archives. (Cited hereafter as A. G. MSS).
32 For reprint of Miller's charge, see Madison Argus and Democrat, July 6,
1854.
33 Ex parte Booth, 3 Wis. 134 (1854).
30
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from a Wisconsin correspondent which declared that the state judges,
in admitting the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States in cases
arising out of the Federal Constitution and laws, had at last recognized
34
a sound principle of law.
On September 11, 1854, Cushing decided to appeal Ableman v.
Booth to the U.S. Supreme Court. Requesting Streeter to initiate action,
he noted that definitive pronouncements were needed on the constitutionality of the act of 1850 and the jurisdictional limits of the state
courts in the issuance of habeas corpus for the release of persons held
in confinement under federal law.3 5 Thereupon, a writ of error was issued by Chief Justice Taney, who ordered a return by the first Monday of the approaching December term. 36
In November, 1854, John Ryecraft was brought to trial in the district court. The highlight of the trial was Miller's charge to the jury.
The doughty judge defended the constitutionality of the law, denied
the defense contention that the jury could rightfully judge the law
as well as the facts, and proclaimed that attacks on federal officers
for the enforcement of the law constituted "the first step towards insurrection." The only real point of law which had been raised by the
defense counsel, outside of "higher law" doctrine, put in issue whether
the prosecution was bound to plead and prove Glover's slave status.
In anticipation of this contention, Ryan and Sharpstein had framed
one count which described Glover as a person owing service and escaping therefrom. In overruling the motion to quash, Miller decided no such proof was necessary to substantiate the other counts,
and, as a consequence, the federal prosecutors made no proof of the
fact upon the trial. Dealing with this matter in the charge, Miller reasserted his position, holding that the indictment revolved about whether Ryecraft aided, abetted and assisted the escape. However, after the
jury returned a verdict of guilty and defense counsel moved to arrest
judgment on the basis of the claim that Glover's slave status needed
to be proven, Miller wavered and decided to write justices Nelson,
37
Grier and Curtis for their opinions and defer a ruling until January.
Early in January, 1855, Sharpstein entered a nolle prosequi to the
original indictment of Booth and procured a new indictment charging
him with obstructing, resisting and opposing the execution of process
Washington Union, Aug. 6, 1854. See also E. G. Ryan to Cushing, Aug. 18,
1854, A. G. MSS.
35 Cushing to Streeter, Sept. 11, 1854, 6 A. G. Op. 713, 714. A few days later
Cushing wrote to Arthur McArthur asking him, "if there be need," to explain
to Justice Smith, a personal friend of his, that the action was in no sense a
36 reflection on him. Cushing to McArthur, Sept. 22, 1854, Cushing MSS.
Transcript of Record, Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506 (1859).
37 Miller's charge is reprinted in U.S. v. Ryecraft, 27 Fed. Cases 918 (1854).
See also, Ryan to Cushing, Dec. 11, 1854 and F. K. Bartlett to Cushing, Nov.
26, 1854, Cushing MSS.

34
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and aiding, assisting and abetting Glover's escape. Booth's attorneys
then moved that the indictment be quashed on the ground that Marshal
Ableman had placed enemies of Booth on the grand jury. After argument Miller overruled the motion and prepared to bring Booth to
trial.38
Now at total war with the federal authorities, Booth procured a
capias from the Milwaukee County Court against both Miller and
Sharpstein for alleged false imprisonment. Forced to give bail for
$5,000 or be imprisoned on the very eve of the trial, Miller asked
Cushing to support a bill, which he had recently urged upon the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees, to extend to all federal officers the
full benefits of the law of 1833. That statute, as mentioned above, for
the most part covered only officers enforcing the revenue statutes
and provided for the removal of suits against them to the federal
courts. "It has come to this," Miller warned, "that the judges and officers must be sustained, or all attempts to enforce the laws on their
part will become futile."3 9
Miller's great concern was reflected, a few days later, in his angry
charge to the jury in the heated Booth trial. He admonished the jury
not to commit "moral perjury" by departing from the law as he defined it. On the basis of advice from the federal judges to whom he
had written, he reaffirmed his earlier ruling that the slave status of
Glover need not be proven. Resolutely determined to protect the federal law enforcement officers, he pointed out that the rescue made the
marshal subject to a civil suit for the value of Glover. He also reminded the citizenry of their duty to aid in the service of process.
Leaving no doubt as to his belief in Booth's guilt, he concluded by
saying that assuming the credibility of the witnesses, a clearer case
of resistance and opposition to process could not have been presented.4"
After the jury found Booth guilty on the final two counts-aiding,
assisting and abetting Glover's escape from lawful custody-Miller denied motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment and sentenced
Booth to thirty days in the county jail and a fine of $1,000 and Ryecraft to a ten day term in jail and a fine of $200.
38

Milwaukee Daily Free Democrat, Jan. 9, 10, 1854 and Milwaukee Sentinel,

Jan. 10, 1854. The first three counts of the new indictment were taken under
the terms of the Act of Apr. 30, 1790 (1 Stat. 117) and the final two counts
were taken under the fugitive slave act of 1850. Booth was not tried earlier
because he had been ill. Messenger died before trial.
39 Miller to Cushing, Jan. 9, 1855, Cushing MSS. Senator Toucey of Connecticut
introduced a bill in Congress early in 1855 to permit removals into federal
courts of suits instituted in state courts against any federal officer for acts
done under authority of federal law. Warren, op. cit., Vol. II, 538.
40 Miller's charge is reprinted in Milwaukee Daily Wisconsin, Jan. 16, 1855. For
evidence that Miller received an answer from the federal judges, see his
letter to Attorney General Jeremiah Black, Nov. 25, 1857, Black MSS, Library of Congress.
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Popular reaction to the conviction manifested itself in meetings at
which fiery resolutions denouncing the fugitive slave law were passed
and funds were collected for the further defense of the prisoners.
Miller was the butt of much of the criticism with one meeting resolving: "We cannot look on the course of Judge Miller with the least
degree of allowance, and .

.

. we regard him as a disgrace to the name

of judge, a tyrant when clothed with a little brief authority, an old
Granny and a miserable Doughface."

41

On January 27, 1855, Booth and Ryecraft, through their lawyers, secured two writs of habeas corpus from the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
one of which was served on Ableman and the other on the county
sheriff. Ableman made a return in which, without acknowledging the
court's jurisdiction, he stated that inasmuch as the prisoners were in
the sheriff's custody at the county jail, he could not produce them in
court. 42 Three days later, the sheriff took the prisoners to Madison.

Some 2,000 people marched along with them to the Milwaukee railroad
depot. As they passed Miller's home, they hissed and hooted and a
43
band played "Jordan is a hard road to travel.
After an ex parte hearing, the Wisconsin court voted unanimously
to discharge both Booth and Ryecraft. Although each judge wrote a
separate opinion reaffirming his views on the constitutionality of the
law, they all agreed that the district court had no jurisdiction because
the counts of the indictments in failing to describe Glover's status,
did not set forth an offense punishable by federal law. 44 The decision
was inconsistent with the court's previous admission that the federal
court had jurisdiction and with an earlier ruling by Chief Justice John
Marshall on this jurisdictional point.4 ' The most that can be said of
the Wisconsin Court's action is that in the absence of a federal right
of appeal open to Booth and Ryecraft by writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court, it chose to regard the federal district court as an inferior
court and by assuming alleged errors to be nullities, assimilated a ha41 Mason, op. cit. supra, 135, 136.
42 Transcript of Record, Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506 (1859).
43 Mason, op cit., 136.
44 In re Booth and Ryecraft, 3 Wis. 144 (1855).
45 It must be said that in denying habeas corpus to Booth late in th2 summer
of 1854, the Wisconsin Court, although admitting the jurisdiction of the
federal court, inconsistently reserved the right to review on habeas corpus
after the trial.
In refusing to review a criminal case from a District of Columbia court
on habeas corpus in 1829, Marshall declared: "It is universally understood that
the judgments of the courts of the United States, although their jurisjiction
be not shown in the pleadings, are yet binding on all the world; and that
this apparent want of jurisdiction can avail the party only on a writ of error
S.. The judgment of the circuit court, in a criminal case, is, of itself, evidence of its own legality and requires for its support, no inspection of the indictment on which it is founded." Ex parte Tobias Watkins, 3 Peters *193,
(1829) at *207.
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eas corpus hearing to a review on a writ of error. Thus in its two decisions, the Wisconsin Court had, in effect, decided that a state judge
could use habeas corpus against the federal courts as a writ of prohibition before judgment and as a writ of error after judgment.
Two days later, Miller opened a session of his court by reading
a long statement of the Wisconsin Court's action. Pointing out that
even Wisconsin law proclaimed the duty of all sheriffs to retain federal prisoners in their custody until discharged by due course of the
laws of the United States, he warned that "if the interposition of this
writ from a state is admitted, the effective abrogation of the laws and
authority of the United States is apparent." Examining the indictments, he showed that the warrant appended to them adequately
described Glover's status. In what appears today as an unanswerable
argument, he declared, "if I should commit an error in any proceeding,
it is to be regretted; but this forms no ground for a tribunal of the
State to discharge a party or convict in this court upon a writ of
habeas corpus." Ominously he asserted that it was now possible "that
some state or county judge or state court commissioner may follow
this precedent, and upon some vague notion of the unconstitutionality
of acts of Congress, or of error in the proceedings in this court ...
discharge all the United States convicts and prisoners from the prisons
and jails of the State." Deciding not to look upon the state court's acttion as an attempt to cause a rupture between the state and the United
States, Miller generously ascribed it to "local excitement." Because
Ryecraft had already served ten days in jail, there was no need to rearrest him. However, Booth still had ten days to serve besides paying
the $1,000 fine. Inasmuch as he obviously could not safely be put in
a state jail, Miller, who saw no immediate need to provide a temporary
4
place of confinement, decided to refer the matter to Washington. a
The next day, Sharpstein informed Streeter that "nothing short of
46 The writer used a reprint of Miller's charge which he found in the Justice
John McLean MSS in the Library of Congress. Miller's apprehensions were
not misplaced. A few days after he delivered his remarks, the same Milwaukee County Judge who had issued habeas corpus after Glover's capture, used
the same writ to release an individual committed to the county jail on a
federal charge of stealing letters from the post office. Apparently the ground
of the judge's action lay in the pronouncement by a majority of the members
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the first Booth case, that the act of
Congress authorizing the appointment of court commissioners was unconstitutional. See letter to editor, Milwaukee News Mar. 1, 1855. Sharpstein immediately reported the incident to Cushing, explaining that the individual
was promptly rearrested. This made the marshal subject to a suit for damages
under the state law forbidding the rearrest of persons so released. Sharpstein further explained that the difficulty lay in the fact that there was no
federal jail and that the writ was served on the Sheriff, who in this and
other instances, obeyed it. Sharpstein suggested that the marshal be instructed
to retain custody of federal prisoners and employ a force sufficient to resist
state interference. Sharpstein to Cushing, Feb. 20, 1855, A. G. MSS. For
another interposition against federal authority at this time by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, see Bagnal v. Ableman, 4 Wis. 84 (1855).
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overpowering force," would awe the nullifiers into submission.4 7
Others throughout the nation felt that drastic action would have to be
taken. The New York Journal of Commerce for example, characterized the action of the Wisconsin Court as "utter subversion of the
powers of the Federal Judiciary," and the Whig New York Express
proposed that Pierce, like Jackson before him, make a special communication of the facts to Congress.4"
Eschewing the Jacksonian approach and the use of force which
an immediate rearrest of Booth would have entailed, the legalistic
Pierce Administration decided to appeal the Wisconsin decision to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Anticipating a refusal of the Wisconsin Court
to recognize a writ of error by ordering its clerk not to send up the
case record, Streeter ordered Sharpstein, as "a precautionary measure,"
to obtain an exemplified copy of the record at once from the clerk
without any reference to the projected appeal. Sharpstein complied
49
and the unsuspecting clerk readily handed him a copy.
When the writ of error was sent to the Wisconsin Court, the
judges decided, in effect, to sever relations with the U.S. Supreme
Court by directing the clerk not to make a return or to enter the writ
upon the Court's journals or records. Sharpstein promptly informed
Streeter that the move was "so intimately connected with state politics
that the consideration of one necessarily involves the other."5 Thoroughly indefensible in law, the Court's action was tantamount to
judicial nullification of Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which
in allowing for such writs of error, had served as the legal basis for
federal review of almost 200 cases, including one from Wisconsin,
up to that time. Then, again, the court was grossly inconsistent. In 1854,
it had assented to a writ of error in Ableman v. Booth and Chief Justice Whiton had admitted in his original opinion in that case that the
decisions of the federal supreme court were final and conclusive upon
all state courts.51
In September, 1855, Cushing revealed his strategy in the case, believing that a due respect for the Wisconsin Court demanded that all
47 Sharpstein to Streeter, Feb. 6, 1855, S. T. MSS. It ought be added at this

point that the principal rescuers were tried for rioting in the Milwaukee Circuit Court, under state law, and found not guilty in the spring of 1855. Milwaukee News, Mar. 14, 15, 1855.
48 Reprinted in Milwaukee News, Mar. 13, 20, 1855.
49 Cushing to Streeter, Feb. 23, 1855, 7 A. G. Op. 52. Streeter to Sharpstein,
Mar. 5, 13, May 4, June 11, 16, Aug. 7, Sept. 29, 1855, Streeter to S. V. Ableman, Apr. 26, 1855. Sharpstein to Streeter, Mar. 28, June 4, Sept. 5, 1855,
Ableman to Streeter, May 8, 1855, S. T. MSS.
50 Sharpstein to Streeter, July 25, 1855, Streeter to Sharpstein, Sept. 29, 1855,
S. T. MSS.
5L The single Wisconsin case was Walworth v. Kneeland, 15 How. 348 (1853).
For Whiton's admission, see In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854) at 63, 64. See also
Chief Justice Taney's observation in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, at
509 (1859).
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legal remedies be first exhausted, he deemed it wise to withhold force
in the application of the sentence upon Booth until a final settlement was
made at the coming term of the federal supreme court.52 Thus Cushing, in March, 1856, after having earlier secured a postponement of
the argument in the first Booth case, moved before the Supreme
Court that the second Booth case be docketed and set down for argument at the next term. However, Taney, speaking for the court, two
months later, decided that "in a matter of so much gravity and importance," a rule should first be made upon the clerk of the Wisconsin Court to make a return before the next term. At the same time,
because of the similarity of the two cases, he ordered that they be argued together, thus precluding any disposition of the matter at that
term.53 When, in March, 1857, it became clear that the Wisconsin
Court would not permit its clerk to comply, the court finally ordered
that the copy of the record, which had been sent up by Sharpstein, be
54
received and the cases argued at the next term.
With the onset of the Buchanan Administration, Sharpstein resigned the district attorneyship and the harassed Ableman resigned as
marshal because he could not devote full time to duties made "embarrassing and arduous by the constant opposition and resistance to the
process and jurisdiction of he court." 55Patronage difficulties now beset
the appointment of new men to these vital positions. Miller, a personal
friend and devoted follower of Buchanan, wrote the new Attorney General, Jeremiah Black, praising the appointment of D.A.J. Upham as
district attorney and criticizing the nomination of M. J. Thomas, a
follower of Senator Stephen A. Douglas, as marshal. Miller was anxious for the appointment of a marshal "who would not intrust dangerous and difficult business to deputies, who in a great measure ag52 ushing to Pierce, Sept. 7, 1855, 7 A. G. Op. 486.
U.S. v. Booth, 18 How. 477 (1856), Ableman v. Booth, 18 How. 479.
(1856). On Feb. 5, 1857, the Wisconsin Supreme Court formalized its verbal
order to the clerk not to comply, by placing a written order to that effect in
its record. See opinion of Chief Justice Luther S. Dixon in Ableman v.
Booth, 11 Wis. 517 (1859). Cushing's motion to postpone argument of the
first Booth case is dated Jan. 4, 1856 in the Docket Book of the U.S. Supreme
54 Court; it is likewise listed in the court's Minute Book.
Ableman v. Booth and U.S. v. Booth, 18 How. 506, at 512 (1859).
55 Sharpstein to Buchanan, Apr. 6, 1857, Ableman to Buchanan, Apr. 29, 1857,
A. G. MSS. The Booth cases were not the sole cause of Ableman's displeasure. He had arrested one Bagnal on a warrant issued by the federal district
court in 1853. After the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in 1855 ,upheld an order
of a lower state court releasing Bagnal on habeas corpus, Ableman was fined
$1250 in a state court for false imprisonment. Because he rearrested Bagnal
after the habeas corpus was issued, Ableman was sued a second time by
Bagnal. In December, 1857, Bagnal was induced by the federal authorities
to discharge the first judgment; the second cause was barred in 'March. 1857,
by the statute of limitations. Bagnal v. Ableman, 4 Wis. 184 (1855). Sharpstein to Streeter, Mar. 4, 1854, Dec. 29, 1855, Mar. 3. 1856, Mar. 8, 1857,
Streeter to Sharpstein, Nov. 29, 1855, Jan. 29, 1856, Streeter to McCelland,
Jan. 12, 1856, S.T. MSS.
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gravate or cause trouble by their recklessness or mismanagement."5
Thenceforth, the factional division in the Democracy between the
followers of Buchanan and the friends of Douglas added to the already great difficulties of law enforcement in Wisconsin.
In November, 1857, Miller wrote a long letter to Black recounting
the history of the Booth cases. He related that earlier that year the
state legislature had joined the judicial nullifiers by passing a personal
liberty law which provided, in part, that judgments recovered against
any person for non compliance with the fugitive slave law could not
constitute a lien against his property. Under this provision, Booth successfully replevined, in a state court, property which had been seized
from him by the marshal in execution of a judgment which Garland,
the owner of Glover, had been previously awarded in Miller's court.
Miller warned Black that the law would be sustained by the state supreme court. As for rearresting Booth at that time, Miller thought
such a move might supply the Republicans with political ammunition.
However, if an arrest were required and a safe place of confinement
could be found, he saw no need to await the action of the U.S. Supreme Court. Probably with the furor over the Dred Scott decision
in mind, Miller expressed a wish that a case not involving a slave
be the occasion for a decision by the supreme court on the delicate
question of conflict of jurisdiction. He revealed that Cushing had
expected that such a case would soon come up for review. 57 This revelation appears significant for it probably explains the reluctance of
Cushing to press for a prompt review of the first Booth case. It is
true that the second adverse decision intervened and logic dictated
that the cases be merged. Nevertheless, despite the importunate urgings
of Ryan and Sharpstein and the obvious comfort afforded to the obstructionists by the lack of swift action, Cushing chose to move slowly.

5

As it turned out, a case not involving a slave did not materialize
and the Booth cases were finally heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on
January 19, 1859, after several attempts had been made in Congress
to emasculate the Court by repealing Section 25 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789. 59 Booth made no appearance, being represented only by a
copy of Paine's original argument which had been appended to his
56 Miller to Black, June 19, 1857, Black MSS, Library of Congress.
5Miller

to Black, Nov. 27, 1855, Black MSS.

58 Ryan to Cushing, Jan. 15, 1855, Cushing MSS; Sharpstein to Cushing, Dec.

18, 1854, Feb. 20, 1855, A. G. MSS. In the latter letter, Sharpstein warned
against delay in enforcing Booth's sentence and pointed out that the first
Booth Case, which had already been appealed, involved essentially the same
questions as the second case. He predicted that before a review of both
cases could be consummated it would become impossible to execute the criminal laws of the U.S. in Wisconsin.
59 Warren, op. cit. supra, Vol. III, 55-58.
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return to the citation in 1854. Black appeared for the United States and
delivered a blistering indictment of the Wisconsin judges, asking the
court to impress upon them that in refusing to send up the record,
they were guilty of contempts and that they owed their impunity not
to any weakness of the U.S. Supreme Court, but to "the magnanimity
of the Government in forebearing to ask for punishment. '60 A few
days later the Madison State Journal threw back the challenge, saying,
"There will be lively times here, if old Buck's court attempts to punish
61
our Judges for contempt."
On March 7, 1859, Taney, speaking for a unanimous court, reversed
both Wisconsin decisions. He vigorously asserted the constitutionality
and necessity of the court's appellate jurisdiction, denied the power of
state judges and courts to interfere by habeas corpus before or after
trial to defeat the jurisdiction of federal tribunals, and pronounced
the fugitive slave act constitutional. Most important for law enforcement purposes, was his prescription of the course to be followed by
federal marshals when confronted with state writs of habeas corpus.
Reaffirming the aforementioned opinion of the Attorney General, he
stated that the duty of a marshal entailed making a return informing
the judge or court involved, of the authority under which he held the
prisoner and refusing to produce the body. If the authority of a state,
in the form of judicial process or otherwise, should then attempt to
deprive the marshal of the custody of his prisoner, "it would be his
duty to resist it, and to call to his aid any force that might be neces62
sary to maintain the authority of law against illegal interference."
Angered by the decision, the Republican Wisconsin Legislature
reacted swiftly by passing a series of resolutions denouncing the
action of the court as "an arbitrary act of power ...

without authori-

ty, void and of no force," and urging "positive defiance" by the states
63
as the "rightful remedy."
In this same truculent state of mind, a Republican caucus, in
March, 1859, ignored the incumbent, Abram D. Smith, and nominated
Booth's advocate, Byron Paine, to run against Democrat William P.
Lynde for a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The subsequent
campaign, which was marked by attacks on Lynde for his predilection
60 Pointing out the dire threat to federal authority in the Wisconsin use of

habeas corpus, Black, after asking the U. S. Supreme Court to imagine itself
listening to arguments of counsel while a county probate judge sat in the
audience, exclaimed: "It is not worth while for the counsel to argue the
case to you, let them address him; for he is the judge of last resort. You
need not charge the jury . . . Charge the judge in the corner; for if you
do not convince him, he will mount his habeas corpus and charge down upon
you . . . One word of his will paralyze your power." EssAYs AND SPEECHES
OF JEREMIAH S. BLACK (N.Y., 1886), 416-430.
O1'Jan. 24, 1859.
62 Ableman v. Booth and U.S. v Booth, 21 How. 506 (1859).
63 \Wis. LAws 1859, p. 247, reprinted in Mason, op. cit., 142, 143.
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to practice in Miller's court, reached its nadir with an uncouth assault
upon the federal judiciary by the politically ambitious Carl Schurz.
Schurz accused the U.S. Supreme Court of procuring the copy of the
record in the second Booth case in "a miserable sneaking way," and
called federal district judges "petty pro-consuls" who meddle in domestic affairs. He was for Paine and states' rights because he did not want
to see the "dirty finger marks of Buchanan's Administration" and
"Judge Miller's opinions and pretensions" impressed upon the Wisconsin Supreme Court. "People of Wisconsin," he shouted, "we have
come to a point where it is loyalty to resist, and treason to submit."6 4
Paine went on to win the election handily and when the moderate
Luther S. Dixon succeeded to the Chief Justiceship upon Whiton's
death later that year, the Wisconsin Court had no member who had
participated in the original Booth decision and but one, Orsamus Cole,
who had participated in the second decision.
In May, 1859, fortune seemed to favor the beleaguered Wisconsin
Democrats when Booth was accused of seduction by a fourteen year
old girl. His successful prosecutor in the 1855 trial, Edward G. Ryan,
jumped at the opportunity to prosecute him in the local circuit court.
Calling upon the full measure of his great powers to repay endless indignities heaped upon the federal authorities for the preceeding five
years, Ryan proceeded to strip the fiery editor of the last vestige of
reputation. Alluding to two confessions allegedly made by Booth before
the trial, he declared:
"If Booth had been innocent, he would have said when arrested by Beck, "Go with me and I will get you bail. You are
doing your duty in arresting me. This false charge has been
made, but the minute I have been discharged on bail I will meet
it. I will demonstrate the malignity, the falsehood of this charge.
No enemy shall overthrow me on the pulling complaint of a
girl. I have stood in the ranks of war too long for that. I have
headed my party when the abolitionists were in absolute personal
danger from the ill feeling of the public. I have built that party
up through the storms of political warfare. I have faced every
sort of assault. I have been assailed by that most terrible of ruthless assailants, Judge Miller, Ableman, of the strong hand, has
taken me by the shoulder and led me. I faced the world, defied
my enemies, revolutionized the state, and triumphed personally
over all my foes. So will I triumph here." That was what Booth
would have said if innocent. He knew persecution of old, and
knew that it helped him, made his fortune. He delights in persecution.
Persecution is profitable to him, politically and pecuniari65
lV."
For text of speech, see Madison State Journal, Mar. 25, 1859. For criticism
of Miller's court during the campaign, see the Mar. 29 and Apr. 5, 1859
editions of the same paper.
65 Trial of Sherman M. Booth For Seduction (Milwaukee, 1859), 273, 274.
64
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Despite the evidence, the jury, possibly influenced by the defense
claim that the trial was a "Democratic Conspiracy," could not agree on
a verdict and the tarnished Booth was freed.
Meanwhile, the choleric Black provoked an altercation with Chief
Justice Taney. Eager to obtain a copy of Taney's opinion in the Booth
cases, Black, on April 26, 1859, became incensed when one of the
aides to the absent clerk of the Supreme Court, William Carroll, informed him that Taney had ordered that no copy be given to any one
until after the publication of the official volume of the court reports.
Demanding a copy in the name and by direction of President Buchanan and "for the public use in a matter of great and pressing importance," Black wrote a stern protest and asked that it be filed. The
distressed assistant clerk then wired Taney in Baltimore and was immediately answered with an order that he give Black a copy. After
receiving it, Black requested Carroll to send him the mandates in the
cases together with two certified copies of the opinion. Carroll promised to send the mandates but decided to consult with Taney before
handing out more copies of the opinion. Rushing to Baltimore, he informed Taney of Black's intransigence and was directed by the Chief
Justice to furnish two copies to Black and one to Buchanan. Angered
by Black's action, Taney then wrote a letter to Carroll stating that if
Black did not withdraw the'protest, he would be compelled to file a
vindication of order and bring the subject before the court at its next
term. He asked Carroll to show the letter to Black and to inform him
that in ordering the copies to be handed over, he (Taney) intended
that they be used only as an aid in the discharge of official duties and
in the confidence that the opinion not be published before it appeared
in the official reports. In painful remembrance of the premature publication of Justice Curtis' dissenting opinion in the Dred Scott case,
Taney was determined that no copy of a court opinion be given to any
public officer except upon application to the presiding officer of the
court and under the conditions stated above.
In compliance with Taney's directive, Carroll went to the White
House and delivired the copy of the opinion to Buchanan, who then
made the comments mentioned at the beginning of this paper on the
need of close cooperation between the court and the executive in the
enforcement of the law. Confronting Black with Buchanan's statement, two days later, Carroll declared that he presumed those were also
the views of the Attorney General. Without producing or alluding to
Taney's letter, he suggested that Black withdraw his protest because
if it were filed, he felt sure than Taney would file a vindication of the
order and call the matter to the court's attention. Black then thanked
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im for the suggestion and withdrew the protest but not before the
careful clerk made a copy of it and filed it away with the case record."
Black's course in this incident may have been dictated by a desire to
initiate action to have the mandates filed before the recalcitrant Wisconsin Supreme Court and proceed to the rearrest of Booth. However,
he had already waited fifty days since the decision had been rendered
and did not act until ten weeks had elapsed after the opinion was published. A more likely explanation of the "matter of great and pressing
importance," alluded to in his protest, lies in the fact that on the very
day that he filed his complaint, he also addressed a letter to a marshal
in Ohio who was anxious for advice as to what course to pursue in the
face of a similar interference by a state writ of habeas corpus. Unable
to send a full certified copy, Black could only cite Taney's opinion in
the Booth cases, while instructing the marshal to decline to produce
67

the prisoners.

On August, 4, 1859, Black sent the mandates to District Attorney
Upham and directed him to lay them before the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. Authorizing Upham to produce his letter if necessary, he told
him that he need not make a motion but merely ask that the mandates
be filed and then respectfully leave the subject to the consideration of
the court. He further instructed Upham to move in the district court,
at as early a day as possible, for the rearrest of Booth. The marshal
was to place him where no effort at a rescue could succeed and if
another habeas corpus were issued, he wis to disregard it and defend
himself against all attempts to free Booth. Urging caution, Black advised Upham "to show no wanton disrespect to the judicial or other
public authorities of Wisconsin," and to guard against provoking any
68

hostility.

66 Black to Clerk of U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 26, 1859; Taney to D. W. Mid-

dleton (Telegram), Apr. 26, 1859; Taney to Carroll, Apr. 28, 1859 Memoranda of William T. Carroll, dated Apr. 26-30, 1859. All of the above can be
found appended to the original transcript of record in Ableman v. Booth and
U.S. v. Booth, 21 How. 506 (1859), Office of the Clerk of the United
States Supreme Court. For the story of the altercation between Taney and
Curtis over the premature publication of Curtis' opinion in the Dred Scott
case, and Taney's refusal to give Curtis a copy of his opinion before the
publication of the official reports, see Swisher, Roger B. Taney ,512-516. In
his above-mentioned letter to Carroll, Taney revealed that he allowed a copy
of his opinion in the Dred Scott case to be given to Governor Walker before it was published in the official reports. He thought this action proper
because Walker was about to go to Kansas and needed the opinion in the
discharge of his official duties. For a full consideration of Taney's order in
connection with the Dred Scott and Booth cases, see my article, " A Note on
Chief Justice Taney and the Publication of Court Opinions," which will appear in the Dec., 1957 edition of the CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW.
67 Black to M. Johnson, Apr. 26, 1859, James Buchanan MSS. Pennsylvania
Historical Society. The Taney opinion was published on or about May 20,
1859. See Washington National Intelligencer, May 21, 1859.
68 Black to Upham, Aug. 4, 1859, Atty. Gen. Ltr. Bk. B-2, 219. The Administration paper had already outlined this policy, Washington CONSTITUTION, June 7,
1859.
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On September 22, 1859, the same day that Upham presented the
mandates to the Wisconsin Court, Harrison Hobart, the Democratic
candidate for governor in the coming autumn election, wrote Black and
Secretary of the Interior Jacob Thompson requesting a deferral of
the rearrest of Booth. Worried over the political effect of such action,
he warned that it "would be seized upon by the enemies of the Administration and converted into a fire-brand of trouble and excitement."60
Marshal Thomas went immediately to Washington to relate in person
to Black the political anxieties of the Democrats on the point. Apparently Black was convinced by his blandishments, reinforced as they
were by a plea from Thompson, for, an October 3, 1859, Thomas wired
Upham from the capital that he was authorized by Black to inform him
to use his discretion and that no fault would be found if the arrest
were delayed. Upham then decided not to arrest Booth before the November term of the district court, by which time the election would
70
be over.
Judge Miller and his "cut-throat" court loomed large as an issue
in the gubernatorial campaign. Hobart was accused of defending Miller's alleged propensity to decide in favor of out-of-state creditors in
civil actions. If Hobart were elected, so reasoned the Madison State
Journal, the state judiciary would be placed under Miller's control and
the state's chief executive would attempt to secure the filing of the
mandates in the Booth cases. 71 In the face of this attack, Hobart met
defeat at the hands of the incumbent, Alexander Randall, who had
previously endorsed the nullifying resolutions of 1859.72
With the election over, Upham moved in Miller's court for an order to rearrest Booth. However, in view of the great excitement over
the John Brown affair and in the fleeting hope that the state supreme
court might yet comply with the mandates, the politically sensitive
73
Miller deferred a decision.
Ten days later, after it became known that the Wisconsin Court by
an evenly-divided vote had refused to file the mandates, Upham informed Black that trouble, in the form of a writ of habeas corpus
could now be expected upon the rearrest of Booth. Warning that the
marshal and his deputies might be overpowered and that there was4 no
place in which Booth could be detained, he asked for instructions.7
Hobart to Black, Sept. 22, 1859, Black MSS.
7OThompson to Black, Oct. 3, 1859, Black MSS; Upham to Black, Oct. 12,
69

1859, A. G. MSS.

Sept. 24, 26, 1859. See also the editions of Sept. 30, Oct. 18, 22, 26, 1859 for
additional attacks on Miller.
72 S. S. Gregory, An Historical Judicial Controversy, 16 MIcH. L. REv. (Jan.,
1913), 188.
73 Miller to Black, Dec. 6, 1859, Black MSS.
74 Upham to Black, Dec. 16, 1859, A. G. MSS. For the Wisconsin decision, see
Ableman v. Booth, 11 Wis. 517 (1859). Justice Paine, having been of counsel
71
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Booth was finally rearrested on Miller's order and placed in the
federal custom house in Milwaukee on March 1, 1860. Immediately
the Republican press beat the drums of criticism anew. The State
Journal, for example charged that the federal authorities were "kindly
interposing to arouse the people of the state." 75 In fact, the rearrest
of Booth played into the hands of the extremists. Since Booth's denigration at the seduction trial, many Republicans had come to despise
him. Similarly, they had also, in good numbers, become cognizant of
the anarchical tendencies of their states' rights stand, particularly in
view of the possibility that their party might soon control the federal
government.-, Nonetheless, if political capital could still be squeezed
out of Booth, and if the federal government was willing to make a
martyr of him, they would take full advantage.
Jehu H. Lewis, who, after succeeding Thomas as marshal upon
the latter's death late in 1859, had aroused the enmity of the Douglas
faction in the appointment of deputies, now outlined his plan of action
to Black. Determined not to allow Booth to be freed on habeas corpus,
he envisioned that he would be found in contempt of the state court
and served with an attachment. In the face of his resistance, the attachment would be enforced by a posse or by state troops. He had evidence that Governor Randall had ordered the commander of the state
militia at Milwaukee to hold his troops in readiness to obey his call
at a moment's notice. In view of this, plus the ominous possibility
of mob action, Lewis resolved to consider the service of habeas corpus upon him as an overt act on the part of the state, after which he
would wire the President for military aid. He indicated that local
volunteer companies might assist him in the event of an attack on the
custom house and revealed that he intended to requisition the St.
Louis arsenal for ammunition. 77 However Governor Randall, after
learning shortly thereafter that aid might be afforded
Lewis, thwarted
78
this design by disbanding the troops involved.
for Booth, did not sit. Chief Justice Dixon voted to file the mandates, Justice
Cole voted to the contrary.
- Lewis to Black, Mar. 1, 1860, A. G. MSS; Madison State Journal, Mar. 2,
1860.
76For Republican attacks on Booth, see Carl Schurz's comments reprinted in
Warren, op cit. supra, Vol. III, 65 and the comments in the Aug. 8, 16, 24,
1859, editions of the Madison State Journal. For Republican attacks on the
extreme states' rights position, see remarks of Timothy Howe in the Apr.
23, May 7, June 25, 1859 editions of the above paper. See also the Feb. 17,
1860 edition of the same paper for an article justifying the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. Chief Justice Dixon appended this article
to his opinion in Ableman v. Booth, 11 WXis. 517 (1859).
77Lewis to Black, 'Mar. 5, 1860, A. G. MSS. Concerning opposition to Lewis see
M. Steever to Black, Dec. 7, 1859 and Miller to Black, Jan. 2, 1860, Black
MSS.
78 Geo. \V. Carter, "The Booth War in Wisconsin," Proceedings of the State
Historical Society of lVisconsin (1902), 164. Milwaukee Daily News, Mar.
6, 9, 1860.
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Fortunately, the anticipated explosion was averted with an evenlydivided Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to grant habeas corpus
to Booth. 9 Tension had diminished but was not dissipated when
Booth's term of imprisonment expired on March 23, 1860. Unwilling
to personally pay his fine and the costs, or have his friends do so for
him, he remained confined in the custom house and brought suit
against Miller and Lewis for false imprisonment. The harassed Miller
asked Black to permit him to hire special counsel to save him the necessity of entering into bonds for a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme
Court on a probable adverse ruling in the state courts and to prevent
a sale of his property pending the final ruling.80
Conscious of the political import of his "martyrdom," Booth
remained defiant. Drawing upon his broad experience as an agitator, he
wrote a series of incendiary letters which were promptly published in
newspapers throughout the state. Maintaining that he had been kidnaped by virtue of a pretended judgment and denied the right to counsel and visits by his friends, he demanded that means be found for
his liberation if the laws and courts of the state were to be accounted
of any force."' By such misrepresentations Booth and his followers
were able to confuse and further inflame the public mind.
Late in April, 1860, Black rejected requests from Upham and
Miller which, along with a petition from several Milwauke citizens,
asked for a remission of Booth's fine. Angrily, Black retorted, "It is
almost impossible to believe that the men who used him as their tool
and cats-paw for so long a time would desert him now, and leave
him to suffer for want of so small a sum as $1,500. The political combination who took advantage of his ignorance and the brutality of his
nature to make him defy the law and the authority of his country
will hardly slink away from him in this extremity. They applauded
his deeds to the very echo; will they not each of them pay a little expense rather than suffer the man who gave them so much pleasure to
spend his days in a prison?" Until the application for a pardon atfrom Booth,
testing to Booth's poverty came in proper form directly
82
Black would give no consideration to such pleas.
Public misunderstanding of the cause of Booth's continued deten79 See note attached to report of Ableman v. Booth, 11 Wis. 517 (1859) at 555558. Early in April a state court commissioner issued a habeas corpus which
was served on Lewis. Lewis made a return refusing to produce the body and
citing the authority by which Booth was held. No attempt was made to en-

force the writ. Madison State journal, Apr. 5, 7, 1860.

80 Miller to Black, Mar. 26, 1860 A. G. MSS. For evidence that Booth did not

want freedom, see his letter to John Fox Potter, dated Mar. 16, 1860, Potter

MSS, Library of Wisconsin State Historical Society.

81 Carter, op. cit. supra, 164, 165. Milwaukee Daily Sentinel, Apr. 16, May 19,

22, 1860.

82 Miller to Black, Mar. 26, 1860, A. G. MSS; Black to Upham, Apr. 25, 1860,

Atty. Gen. Ltr. Bk. B-2397.
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tion finally brought Upham, upon Miller's advice, to publish a clarifying letter explaining the legal basis for the confinement and relating
that inasmuch as Booth had been shown Black's letter setting forth
the steps to be taken to secure a remission of the fine, he remained
in prison at his own option.

3

By the summer of 1860 the unwillingness of the President and Attorney General of the United States to release Booth insured that the
question would play a significant part in the presidential election campaign. Miller felt certain that if it had not been for the opposition politicians, Booth would have long since paid the fine or applied for a remission. Likewise, he was convinced that it would now be impossible
for the marshal to retain him in his custody. He related to Black that
the Lincoln adherents were exploiting the situation to their advantage
and the Douglas men were disposed to advance as many complaints as
possible against the local functionaries of the Buchanan Administra84

tion.

After eight abortive attempts to free Booth, and after an evenly-divided Wisconsin Supreme Court again refused habeas corpus, a forcible rescue was effected by a band of armed men on August 1, 1860.
Whisked away to Waupun, Wisconsin, Booth went to the state prison
where he was welcomed by the protecting arms of Hans Heg, the state
prison commissioner.8 5
The Lincoln and Douglas camps gloated over the embarrassment of the federal authorities. Lewis had wired ahead to Satterlee
Clark, a prominent Douglasite, authorizing him to arrest Booth. Encountering Booth, Clark allegedly told him that if Douglas had been
president he would have arrested him, but that no one in that region
wished to aid men like Buchanan and Lewis, who were prostituting
their offices to satisfy Buchanan's desire for revenge and, in the process, aiding the Republican Party. 6 "We trust this will be a lesson to
Lewis and all officers of Buchanan," commented a leading Douglasite newspaper."'
Beset by tremendous obstacles in the form of a hostile public, an
inability to rely on the telegraph lines, and the difficulty of enlisting
83 Upham to editor, Milwaukee News, July 19, 1860 (clipping found attached

to letter of Miller to Black, July 20, 1860, A. G. MSS). See also Milwaukee
Sentinel, July 20, 1860. For criticism of Booth's imprisonment, including letters from the prisoner, see the Apr. 16, 24, 26, 28, May 17, 19, 22, 25, June 2,
30, 1860 editions of the Milwaukee Sentinel. Since Ryecraft had not been
imprisoned for not having paid his fine, it seemed unjust to many that
Booth should be kept in jail after having served his sentence.
84 Miller to Black, July 20, 1860, Aug. 4, 1860, A. G. MSS.
85 Lewis to Buchanan, Aug. 3, 9, 1860, Feb. 22, 1861, Miller to Black, Aug. 4,
1860, A. G. MSS. For Booth's story of the rescue, see Booth to editor, Milwaukee Daily Free Democrat, Aug. 6, 1860.
8 Lewis to Buchanan, Aug. 9, 1860, A. G. MSS; Miller to Black, Aug. 4, 1860,
A. G. MSS; Horicon Argus, Aug. 3, 1860.
87 Horicon Argus, Aug. 3, 1860. Booth gave a different account of the event,
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reliable men to aid him, Lewis now dispatched a few deputies to retake Booth. 8s Deputy Francis Henry, on August 3, 1860, sent a note
to Heg telling him that he had a warrant for Booth's arrest and asking him to assist in executing the law. When Deputy William Garlick
delivered the note at the prison, Heg called Booth into the room and, in
the presence of several guards, told Garlick that he could arrest Booth
if he chose, but if he were in Booth's place, he would shoot him down
like a dog. He added that he himself would fight to the last drop of
his blood if an attempt at an arrest were made and that Garlick ought
be employed in better business than holding office under the federal
government. While this was going on, Booth kept flourishing a pistol
around Garlick's head, saying that he would shoot down the first man
to lay hands on him. Heg then handed over to Garlick a written reply
to Henry's note, stating that Booth was not secreted in the prison but
merely visiting with him and at liberty to go when he pleased. As to
rendering any assistance in an arrest, he declared: "Allow me politely to
say that my force is at present employed in a more profitable and
honorable way." However, although Heg later publicly denied it, it
apepars that whenever Booth went outside the prison walls, he was
under the protective surveillance of at least one prison guard. 9
That night, Booth, accompanied by two of the omnipresent prison
guards, rode in Heg's carriage to Ripon, Wisconsin. There he found
refuge in the amply guarded home of one of his rescuers, Edward
Daniels, the state geologist. The next evening, Booth was escorted by
an armed force of about 200 men, to a hall to give a speech. Deputy
Frank McCarty and two aides stationed themselves within supporting
distance of each other in the hope of taking Booth. Booth began to
speak, declaring truculently, as he looked directly at McCarty, that he
would like to see the marshal or deputy marshal who dared attempt to
rescue him. McCarty then slipped quietly on the stage, put his hand
on Booth and told him he was his prisoner. Booth atempted to draw
his pistol but was forestalled by McCarty. The angered crowd then
rushed forward shouting, "kill him," "cut him to pieces," and ejected
McCarty uncerimoniously from the building. 90
stating that Clark had attempted unsuccessfully to raise a force to arrest
him, and having seen the complexion of things, tried to turn the affair into
a joke. Booth to editor, Milwaukee Daily Free Democrat, Aug. 6, 1860.
88 Lewis to Buchanan, Aug. 3, 9, 1860, A. G. MSS.
59 Affidavits of Francis Henry and William Garlick, dated Aug. 8, 1860, appended to Lewis' letter of Aug. 9, 1860 to Buchanan, A. G. MSS. Henry's note
and Heg's reply are reproduced in the Henry affidavit. Booth told a different story of the events as did Heg, but unlike the statements of the deputies,
which were sworn to, their remarks came in letters to newspapers. See Booth
to editor, Milwauke Daily Free Democrat, Aug. 6, 1860. Heg to editor, Milwaukee Sentinel, Aug. 6, 1860.
90 Affidavit of Frank McCarty, dated Aug. 7, 1860, appended to Lewis' letter to
Buchanan, Aug. 9, 1860. A. G. MSS. Booth's version, in his Aug. 6, 1860 letter,
differs in some details from McCarty's account.
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After disposing of McCarty, the meeting, headed by A. E. Bovay
who six years before had organized the meeting at Ripon at which
the Republican party was born, passed resolutions pledging to protect
Booth at all hazards. Three hundred men were enrolled as a league
of freedom to serve that purpose. Booth then published a defiant letter
recounting the events and proclaiming: "The people are ready to fight
and have made up their minds to do it manfully. They will wait no
longer for Courts or State authorities, but will protect their own
rights and liberties by the strong arm." He warned that "if the
Federal hounds continue to pursue and harass free citizens, and
threaten, as they have done, to kill them if they resist, they will be
shot down in the highways and byways like mad dogs.""'
On August 29, McCarty was informed that Booth was staying in
a private home seven miles from Ripon where he might be captured
by surprise. Accompanied by five men, McCarty left Fond du Lac
after nightfall and arrived at the location just before daylight. Before
they could search the house, the deputies were surrounded by an
armed force of 60 or 70 men who expressed their determination to
resist process with force. The commands of McCarty, ordering the
men to assist him, were met with derision and threats to lynch him.
Shortly after McCarty was forced to retreat to Ripon, another federal
deputy marshal arrived on the scene with three other men, and was
promptly seized by the mob and paraded down the Ripon streets with
a yoke on his head.

92

Lewis, in the meanwhile, had been able, through his deputies, to
arrest Daniels and another of the rescuers but was unsuccessful in
his attempts to rescue a third, 0. H. La Grange. Just as defiant of the
law as Booth, La Grange published a letter on August 27, relating that
he had decided to spend a season in retirement to consider whether
he would submit to arrest. He and his friends had spent several evenings preparing to enlist and organize an army of defense. Wishing
to perpetuate his name as a courageaus, unselfish patriot, he believed
it his duty to work for the ultimate extinguishment of slavery by lawful means, if possible, but by war if necessary. 93
Realizing that the combination to resist federal proces's was far
more formidable than previously supposed, Lewis declined to call
upon the military aid of the federal government. He believed that such
a step would inevitably precipitate a bloody collision and trusted instead
Booth to editor, Milwaukee Daily Free Democrat, Aug. 6, 1860: Carter, op.
cit. supra 167.
92 T. L. Mapes to Lewis, Aug. 26, 1860, Lewis to Black, Aug. 29, 1860, J. S.
Homer to Buchanan, Aug. 6, 1860, A. G. MSS. McCarty waited in vain for
reinforcements for seven hours. The armed force protecting Booth gathered
within an hour. Milwaukee News, Aug. 29, 1860.
93Upham to Black, Aug. 18, 1860, Lewis to Black, Aug. 27, 1860, A. G. MSS;
Carter, op. cit. supra, 170.
91
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to strategem. In the process he had to submit to vile indignities and
threats of assasination which, at one point, caused him to lose his temper and strike unconscious with a mighty blow of his cane, one of
Booth's obnoxious followers, who he believed was about to attack him.
As a consequence, he found himself the defendant in civil and criminal
actions for assault and battery. Similarly, economic retaliation was
visited upon McCarty, who complained to Lewis that the "Black Re94
publicans" had boycotted his grain warehouse.

As the election drew closer, the political usefullness of Booth diminished, along with the furor over the attempts to arrest him. Finally, on October 8, 1860, Lewis captured him from the midst of fifty
Republican Wide-Awakes at Berlin, Wisconsin. Experiencing no appreciable resistance, he successfully transported Booth back to the
custom house at Milwaukee. 95 Apparently the Republicans believed
that at that stage, a rearrest of Booth would be more beneficial to
their cause than if he remained free. Whatever their attitude, after
Lincoln's election Booth applied to Buchanan for a pardon. Infuriated,
Black immediately replied to Upham, who had again urged that the
fine be remitted, rejecting the petition. Black complained that Booth's
plea contained no confession that his manifest violence constituted an
offense against the government and the peace of society. Still inflexibly determined to enforce the letter of the law "4igorously, he declared:
"The fact that in all this criminal folly and insolence, he has been
aided, comforted and abetted by a State Court and by other lawless
persons who pretend to justify him, makes the vindication of the law in
this particular case absolutely necessary by way of example." Black
could not recall any instance when a pardon was ever given, or a fine
remitted, "where the poverty of the applicant was incidentally mentioned in a paper filled with insolent expressions of contempt for the
law under which he was suffering." Black would honor only a simple
verified petition by Booth asserting his inability to pay. On the other
hand, a pardon would be granted if it could be shown that Booth was
94 Lewis to Buchanan, Jan. 28, Feb. 22, 1861, McCarty to Lewis, Jan. 24, 1861,

A. G. MSS; Milwaukee Daily Enquirer, Aug. 6, 1860. Lewis' decision against

95

calling for federal military aid was probably influenced by the lack of encouragement from the federal authorities at Washington. He emphasized, in
his Aug. 9, 1860 letter to Buchanan, his belief that "a large body of those
persons who have been deluded into violations of the law would quietly
yield the moment they saw the Government was prepared to enforce its
powers." The present writer was unable to find any evidence that the Buchanan Administration contemplated either the sending of federal troops to aid
the marshal or the issuing of a presidential proclamation.
Lewis to Black, Oct. 9, 1860, A. G. MSS. Contrary to Lewis, Carter states
that Booth was arrested while returning from the political meeting, accompanied only by ladies. Carter, op. cit. supra, 171. Thereafter, Booth's wife,
writing from Switzerland to the people of Wisconsin, asked: "Have you no
pride for yourselves, no grateful regard for your leader, who has spent his
life and energies to bring you, as a party, to the stand point you occupy today?" For reprint of letter see Madison State Journal, Nov. 21, 1860.
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suffering from a mental disease which impelled him to deny the existence or the obligatory force of the law and to set himself against all
of the authorities of the National Government.96
As the fateful year of 1861 dawned, a federal grand jury indicted
the leaders of the forcible rescue of 1859 along with the principal figures involved in the resistance to the attempts to capture Booth. Lewis
promptly arrested them at Ripon but was forced to relinquish them to
a group of armed men at the depot. Fustrated again, he reported to
Black that the men could not be brought back to Milwaukee "without
a strong police or a military force." 97
On the day before the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln, President
Buchanan pardoned Booth. 9s The painful episode closed with the nullifiers victorious and federal authority rescued from further repudiation
in Wisconsin by the fact that the Republican party now held the reins
of government in Washington.
Thus ended a decade which George Ticknor Curtis decribed as a
period wherein "a government popular in its form and accustomed to
rely largely on popular submission to its laws, was obliged to make it
manifest that it had the strength, irrespective of popular and local
feelings, to execute the law."99 With all its ineptitudes, inflexibility and
time consuming legalism, federal law enforcement policy in the Booth
imbroglio remains a woeful reminder that in the presence of state and
popular hostility the firm and prompt deployment of overpowering
force within the framework of adequate administrative machinery,
alone can insure the full execution of the law.

96 Black to Upham, Nov. 7, 1860, Atty. Gen. Ltr. Bk. B-2, 586. In his fourth
annual message on Dec. 3, 1860, Buchanan stated that universal judicial
acceptance of the constitutionality of the fugitive slave act of 1850 was
marred only by the defection of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. That decision,
he continued, "has not only been reversed by the proper appellate tribunal,
but has met with such universal reprobation that there can be no danger
from it as a precedent." Richardson, op. cit. supra, Vol. VII, 3160, 3161.
97 Lewis to Black, Jan. 28, 1861, A.G. MSS.
98 Edwin M. Stanton to Black, Mar. 2, 1861, A. G. MSS.
9 Benjamin R. Curtis Jr., Editor, A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN R. CURTIS (Boston,
1879), Vol. I, 158.
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